NEWS  In pursuing its Indo-Pacific strategy, India needs to be mindful of the China-U.S. equations in the region.

BACKGROUND

• The island of Taiwan is the unfinished business of China’s liberation under the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) in 1949.
• The Guomindang (KMT) forces under Chiang Kai-shek lost the 1945-49 civil war to the CCP forces under Mao Zedong.
• Chiang retreated to the island of Taiwan and set up a regime that claimed authority over the whole of China and pledged to recover the mainland eventually.
• The CCP in turn pledged to reclaim its lost territory and achieve the final reunification of China.
• Taiwan could not be occupied militarily by the newly established People’s Republic of China (PRC) as it became a military ally of the United States during the Korean War of 1950-53.
• This phase came to an end with the U.S. recognising the PRC as the legitimate government of China in 1979, ending its official relationship with Taiwan and abrogating its mutual defence treaty with the island.

STRATEGIC AMBIGUITY

• The U.S. under its policy of “strategic ambiguity” has declared that it will “maintain the ability to come to Taiwan’s defence” while not committing itself to do so.
• China, on the other hand, is committed to pursuing peaceful unification but retains the right to use force to achieve the objective. This is its own version of strategic ambiguity.

CHINA’S APPROACH SIMILAR TO THAT IN HONG KONG

• The PRC has pursued a typical carrot and stick policy to achieve the reunification of Taiwan with the mainland.
• It has held out the preference for peaceful reunification, through promising a high degree of autonomy to the island under the “one country two systems” formula first applied to Hong Kong after its reversion to Chinese sovereignty in 1997.
  • According to this formula, Hong Kong would retain its free market system and its political and judicial institutions and processes for a period of 50 years, thus enabling an extended and gradual transition.
  • The same was promised to Taiwan, but with the added assurance that it could also retain its armed forces during the transition period.

ECONOMIC LINKS

• China has adopted market-oriented reforms since 1978, in China itself adopting market-oriented reforms since 1978.
  • As a result, over a period of time, Taiwan business entities have invested heavily in mainland China and the two economies have become increasingly integrated.
• Between 1991 and 2020, the stock of Taiwanese capital invested in China reached U.S. $188.5 billion and bilateral trade in 2019 was U.S. $150 billion, about 15% of Taiwan’s GDP.
  • By contrast the stock of Chinese capital invested in Taiwan is barely U.S. $2.4 billion although investments through Hong Kong may be considerable.

FAILED ATTEMPTS

• Taiwanese attempts to reduce the island’s economic exposure to China have not been successful so far.
• China is capable of inflicting acute economic pain on Taiwan through coercive policies if the island is seen to drift towards an independent status.

TAIWAN’S POLITICS

• Taiwan has two major political parties:
  • The KMT, dominated by the descendants of the mainlanders who came to the island along with Chiang Kai-skek in 1949, remains committed to a one-China policy and does not support the independence of Taiwan.
  • The Democratic Progressive Party (DPP), on the other hand, is more representative of the indigenous population of the island, and favours independence.

CHINESE HOSTILITY TO DPP

• China feels more comfortable with the KMT and is hostile to the DPP.

• Ever since the DPP under Tsai Ing-wen won the presidential elections in 2016, China has resorted to a series of hostile actions against the island, which include economic pressures and military threats.
  • These actions have escalated since the re-election of Tsai Ing-wen in the 2020 elections.
  • Public opinion swung in her favour as China adopted a series of hardline policies in Hong Kong, abandoning the ‘One Country Two Systems’ formula promoted by Chinese leader Deng Xiaoping.
  • China could no longer pretend that the model was relevant in any sense to Taiwan’s future under Chinese sovereignty.

IMPLICATION OF THIS DEVELOPMENT

• One important implication of this development is that prospects for peaceful unification have diminished.
• Sentiment in Taiwan in favour of independent status has increased.
• The escalating military threats against Taiwan, through daily violations of its air defence identification zone (ADIZ) and aggressive naval manoeuvres in the Taiwan Strait are currently deterrent in nature.
  • These threats are aimed at heading off any move towards independence and its closer military relationship with the U.S.

THE U.S. STANCE

• The U.S. does not support a declaration of independence by Taiwan.
  • However, it has gradually reversed the policy of avoiding official-level engagements with the Taiwan government.
• The first breach occurred during the Donald Trump presidency when several senior officials, including a cabinet-level official, visited the island.
  • The Joe Biden officials have continued this policy.
• In another incident, the Taiwanese representative in Washington was invited to attend the presidential inauguration ceremony (Biden), again a first since 1979.
• There are also reports, according to which the U.S. defence personnel have been, unannounced, training with their Taiwanese counterparts for some time.
  • In an incident last week, a U.S. nuclear-powered submarine reportedly ran into an “unidentified object” while in the South China Sea.
• In recent developments, the U.S. President has reportedly assured the Chinese premier that the U.S. would abide by the “Taiwan agreement”, that is, the U.S. would not overturn its one China policy.

IS CHINA PREPARED TO CARRY MILITARY OPERATIONS TO INVADE AND OCCUPY TAIWAN?

• The U.S. Pacific Commander, Philip Davidson had warned that China could invade Taiwan within the next six years as part of its strategy of displacing U.S. power in Asia.
• While other analysts argue that the cross-strait operations would be extremely complex and pacifying a hostile population may prove to be long drawn out and costly.
  • China may, therefore, be content to head off Taiwan independence while continuing to build its capabilities and await a further relative decline of U.S. power and its will to intervene in the defence of Taiwan.

IMPACT OF ALLIANCES

• These calculations may be upset by accident or miscalculation, and the recent submarine incident is a warning in this respect.
• The recent crystallisation of the Quad, of which India is a part, and the announcement of the Australia-U.K.-U.S. alliance, AUKUS, with Australia being graduated to a power with nuclear-powered submarines, may act as a deterrent against Chinese moves on Taiwan.
• But they may equally propel China to advance the unification agenda before the balance changes against it in the Indo-Pacific.

CONCLUSION

• • Taiwan is emerging as a potential trigger point for a clash of arms between the U.S. and China.

• If the rising confrontation between the United States and China erupts into a clash of arms, the likely arena may well be the Taiwan Strait.

• In pursuing its Indo-Pacific strategy, India should do well to keep the possible scenarios in mind.

Reference:

1. https://www.thehindu.com/opinion/lead/a-taiwan-flashpoint-in-the-indo-pacific/article36933319.ece