CONTEXT 

• • There have always been political tensions between India and China over:
    • Each country’s territorial claims over land controlled by the other,
    • China’s “all-weather” alliance with our hostile separated sibling, Pakistan,
    • India’s hospitality to the Dalai Lama, who was granted refuge when he fled Tibet in 1959.
  • Yet neither country had allowed these tensions to overwhelm them.

• But, fifteen months after the clashes between Chinese and Indian soldiers in the Galwan Valley, India-China relations are at their lowest ebb in living memory.

INDIA’S EFFORTS TO NORMALISE THE RELATIONS

• India has usually shown no desire to provoke our northern neighbour, but to relegate the border problem to the back burner while enabling trade relations with China.
• As a result, at present the Trade between the two countries is now close to $100 billion.
• India made it clear that it was unwilling to join in any United States-led “containment” of China.
• In October 2019 in Mahabalipuram, at their 18th meeting in nine years, the Chinese President and Indian Prime had grandly pledged to take relations between their two countries to “greater heights”.
  • To mark the 70th anniversary of formal diplomatic relations between the two countries, they announced they would conduct 70 joint activities, including further improving their burgeoning trade, supporting scholarly research into their ancient civilizational links, and even exchanging military delegations, in a grand show of Sino-Indian cooperation.
• As a result the two countries had indeed developed multiple avenues of engagement. From negligible levels till 1991, trade with China had grown to become one of India’s largest trading relationships.
• Further, the Indian Prime Minister had lifted residual restrictions on bilateral Chinese investment in strategic sectors of the Indian economy (notably ports, airports, power generation and telecoms technology).
  • Consequently, Chinese investment (current and planned) by 2020, stood at about $26 billion with infrastructure projects accounting for about half the total.
• India also engages with China diplomatically in-
  • the BRICS (an association of Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa),
  • in annual summits of RIC (Russia-India-China).
• India is an enthusiastic partner in the Chinese-led Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank and the New Development Bank (NDB), formerly referred to as the BRICS Development Bank.

CHINA IN BETTER POSITION

• The policy of side-stepping contentious issues and encouraging bilateral economic relations has played into Chinese hands.
  • The People’s Liberation Army has used the seemingly benign situation to repeatedly undertake “minor” military incursions, inflict small-scale military setbacks on India, take a few square kilometres of territory along the Line of Actual Control (LAC) for local tactical purposes, and then declare peace.
  • Mutual disengagements are duly announced, both sides claim the crisis is over, but China establishes and fortifies its new deployment.

Thus, these mini-crises always end with the Chinese in a better position on the ground than before and establishing a new “normal” on the LAC.

CHINESE STRATEGY

Consolidate LAC:

• • In the Galwan clash, the Chinese troops seem to have been engaged in a tactical move to advance their positions along areas of the LAC that it covers, in order to threaten Indian positions and interdict patrols.
  • After the recent incursions, the Chinese now reportedly control over 900 square kilometres of area in Ladakh along the LAC.
  • They are threatening India’s construction of roads, bridges and similar infrastructure on undisputed Indian territory, a belated effort to mirror similar Chinese efforts near the LAC in Tibet.
  • Rather than merely patrolling, they have-
    • established a fixed presence in these areas well beyond China’s own ‘Claim Line’,
    • occupied the “Finger Heights” near Pangong Tso Lake,
    • pitched hundreds of tents,
    • constructed concrete structures
    • built additional kilometres of road along the LAC.

• The objective seems to be to extend Chinese troop presence to the intersection of the Galwan river and the Shyok river, which would make the Galwan Valley off bounds to India.

• • Further, Chinese have constructed permanent structures in the area of their intrusion and issued statements claiming that sovereignty over the Galwan valley has “always belonged” to China.

• China’s strategy seems to be to consolidate the LAC where it wants it, so that an eventual border settlement — that takes these new realities into account — will be in its favour.

Showcasing India as subsidiary:

• While border incidents keep the Indians off balance, China demonstrates to the world that India is not capable of challenging China, let alone offering security to other nations.

INDIA’S RESPONSE

• It has reinforced its military assets on the LAC to prevent deeper incursions for now, and hopes to press the Chinese to restore the status quo ante through either diplomatic or military means.
• Chinese and Indian officials are currently engaged in diplomatic and military-to-military dialogue to ease tensions, but de-escalation has been stalled for months, with China behaving as if their disengagement is already complete.
• India has responded with largely symbolic acts of economic retaliation, banning Chinese apps in India on grounds of data security.
• It is likely that Chinese companies will be barred from various lucrative opportunities in the vast Indian market.
• Huawei and ZTE, have been from the ongoing trials to be picked to build India’s 5G telecoms infrastructure.
• India has also reimposed tighter limits on Chinese investment in projects such as railways, motorways, public-sector construction projects, and telecoms.

ECONOMICAL ANGLE

• Yet, India is far too dependent on China for other vital imports — such as pharmaceuticals, and even the active ingredients to make them, automotive parts and microchips, all needed by Indian manufacturers.
• Today, India’s dependence on China for its non-consumption economy remains high. Further imports from China have become indispensable for India’s exports to the rest of the world.
• Various manufacturing inputs, industrial equipment and components, and even some technological know-how come from China and eliminating them could have a seriously negative effect on India’s economic growth.
• There are limits to the effectiveness of any Indian retaliation: trade with China may seem substantial from an Indian perspective, but it only represents 3% of China’s exports.
  • Drastically reducing it would not be enough to deter Beijing or cause it to change its behaviour.

CONCLUSION

• Taking into account all the factors, the range of considerations seems to leave only two strategic options for India:
  • Reconciling itself to playing second to an assertive China in the region.
  • Seeking strength and leverage by aligning itself with a broader international coalition against Chinese ambitions.

Reference:

1. https://www.thehindu.com/opinion/lead/hardly-the-india-china-century-deng-envisioned/article36484713.ece