CONTEXT

• The recent visit by the Indian Air Force chief to Israel offers a window to study how New Delhi is taking advantage of the Abraham Accords deal signed between Israel and a consortium of Arab States led by the United Arab Emirates (UAE) in 2020.

ABRAHAM ACCORDS

• The Abraham Accords are a joint statement between Israel, the United Arab Emirates, and the United States, reached on August 13, 2020.
• Subsequently, the term was used to refer collectively to agreements between Israel and the United Arab Emirates (the Israel–United Arab Emirates normalization agreement) and Bahrain, respectively (the Bahrain–Israel normalization agreement).
• The statement marked the first public normalization of relations between an Arab country and Israel since that of Egypt in 1979 and Jordan in 1994.
• The original Abraham Accords were signed by the Emirati Foreign Minister, the Bahraini Foreign Minister, Israeli Prime Minister, and U.S. President on September 15, 2020, at the South Lawn of the White House in Washington, D.C.
• The accords are named after Abraham to emphasize the shared origin of belief between Judaism and Islam, both of which are Abrahamic religions that strictly espouse the monotheistic worship of the God of Abraham.

DEEPENING COOPERATION

• Starting from the relatively low-key staging visit to Saudi Arabia conducted by the IAF in 2015, to hosting visiting Iranian naval warships in 2018, defence of the critical waterways in and around the Persian Gulf, the Arabian Sea and the extended Indian Ocean Region (IOR), India has increased its strategic footprint in West Asia.
• In December 2020, Indian Army chief, General M.M. Naravane, visited the UAE and Saudi Arabia, becoming the first chief of the Indian Army to do so.
• India has also recently conducted the ‘Zayed Talwar’ naval exercises with the UAE off the coast of Abu Dhabi, further deepening the fast-developing strategic cooperation between the two countries.
• According to reports, an Indian contingent of the Indian Air Force (IAF) will visit Israel in October to take part in multilateral military exercises.
• The above examples show the pacey developments on the defence front between India and the West Asian region.

SIGNIFICANCE OF THE ACCORD FOR INDIA

• New Delhi had welcomed the Accords, highlighting its support for mechanisms that offer peace and stability in the region.
  • The signing of the Accords has removed a significant strategic obstacle for New Delhi, i.e. trapeze wire delicate balancing act India has had to play out between the Arab Gulf and Israel over the decades.

 PERSISTING CHALLENGES

Saudi Arabia:

• To a certain extent, the Accords, from the UAE’s perspective, were to make sure the emirate along with its international centres of trade such as Dubai and Abu Dhabi do not become targets between Jerusalem and Tehran.
• However, not all Arab States have been on board with the geopolitical shifts the Accords have pushed through.
• Despite a lot of effort from Israel, Saudi Arabia has maintained a distance from this arrangement.
• More recently, Riyadh has praised the Accords, but said that the resolution of the Palestinian State remains at the forefront of its requirements.

Iran:

• There are multiple obstacles to the India-Iran bilateral relations led by U.S. sanctions against Iran and the general tensions between Israel, the Gulf and Iran via proxy battles in theatres such as Yemen, Syria and beyond.
  • Recently, as tensions between Iran, Israel and the United States flared up in the Persian Gulf, as a result, the Indian Navy orchestrated Operation Sankalp, which saw Indian warships escort on an average 16 Indian-flagged vessels a day.

The Iran link:

• Iran, as part of India’s ‘West Asia’ construct, will also play a significant part in India’s outreach in the months to come as the crisis in Afghanistan deepens.

• • New Delhi used Iranian airspace and facilities when evacuating its diplomatic staff from Kandahar in July showcases a level of strategic commonality, interest and play on certain issues in the region.
• Considering this, connectivity projects such as Chabahar Port and Chabahar-Zahedan rail project amongst others remain critical.

One- sided decisions of India:

• Despite India’s arguable successes in a ‘non-alignment’ approach in West Asia, it has taken one-sided decisions in the past.
  • It had trained Iraqi Air Force cadets on MiG aircraft in Tikrit between 1958 and 1989 and also maintained good relations with former President Saddam Hussein.
• This can be seen as a critical part of India’s energy security thinking.
• But, the rationale behind such thinking has not seen a significant change as India still imports more than 80% of its annual oil requirements, much of it from Iraq and Saudi Arabia.

CONCLUSION

• • India’s strategic play in West Asia will be reflective of its economic growth, and its increasingly important place in the global order.

• Hence, from the UN Security Council to the Indo-Pacific, New Delhi will be expected to be more assertive, diplomatically and militarily, in its posturing.

Reference:

1. https://www.thehindu.com/opinion/op-ed/the-abraham-accords-as-indias-west-asia-bridge/article36007225.ece