CONTEXT

• Recently, more evidence has emerged that the People’s Republic of China (PRC) is expanding the size of its nuclear arsenal by building more missile silos.  

CONCERNS

The source of concern is over:

The scope and prospective size of the PRC’s nuclear capabilities

• The construction of the nuclear missile silo field in Xinjiang region in western China indicates the PRC is fielding a larger nuclear force based on fixed land-based capabilities.
• The site is believed to host 110 silos.
• This development comes against the backdrop of evidence that China had built a site with 120 silos in the arid region of Yumen, in the Gansu province.

Rate and extent

• Chinese nuclear forces stand at roughly anywhere between 250 to 350 nuclear warheads according to the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) as well as the Federation of American Scientists (FAS).

POSSIBLE REASONS BEHIND CHINA’S ACT

• The most likely reason behind the current expansion of China’s nuclear arsenal is:
  • increase the survivability of its arsenal against a first strike from their nuclear adversaries, most prominently the United States.
  • Washington, which possesses a larger arsenal, stands at 3,800 warheads, and paired with its growing missile defence capabilities poses a threat to Chinese retaliatory nuclear forces.
    • However, other countries too loom large in China’s nuclear expansion such as Russia and India.

POSSIBILITY OF MISLEAD

• There are possibilities that the current silo-based missile expansion being undertaken by the PRC can be misleading to conceal the number of missiles tipped with nuclear warheads in its possession.

SURVIVABILITY AGAINST FIRST STRIKE STRATEGY

• Land-based nuclear capabilities also enable the Chinese to present a nuclear adversary with a larger menu of targets to strike. Thus, exhausting a large number of the enemy’s missiles in a first strike.
  • Indeed, some of the decoy silos are meant to absorb and exhaust a part of the enemy’ first strike nuclear forces.
  • Thus, the larger the target list for any potential opponent, the greater the chances of China’s arsenal surviving a first strike thereby boosting the credibility of China’s nuclear deterrent.
• In all probability, the PRC is expanding its nuclear forces if not to match the larger nuclear forces fielded by the Americans and the Russians, but sufficient to withstand a first strike and then execute a retaliatory attack that would defeat the adversary.

IMPROVING ITS MISSILE SYSTEM

• China’s nuclear tipped ballistic missiles forces, whether land-based or sea-based, have certainly improved in quantity and quality.
• The PRC’s Intercontinental Ballistic Missile (ICBM) capabilities and Intermediate Range Ballistic Missile (IRBM) capabilities in the form of the Dongfeng-41 (DF-41) and the DF-26, respectively, are its most potent land-based missile systems.

IMPACT OF CHINESE NUCLEAR DEVELOPMENTS

Globally:

• The latest development of silos presents a grim and disturbing set of consequences for the world and India.
• The PRC has refused to enter any tripartite arms control negotiations with Americans and Russians that could forestall the deployment of a more numerically robust nuclear arsenal.
  • It seems that the current build-up by Chinese nuclear development is considered as a necessity by China to bridge the nuclear asymmetries it faces vis-à-vis Washington and Moscow.

India:

• The growth in China’s nuclear arsenal might not have an immediate impact on India, but its development of land-based nuclear silos in the Xinjiang province is cause to worry, given the region’s proximity to India.
• Also, it is likely to have an impact on the ongoing boundary stand-off between the two countries in Eastern Ladakh.
• Fixed land-based nuclear capabilities gives China coercive leverage in consolidating its territorial gains in Depsang, Demchok and Gogra-Hotsprings.

CONCLUSION

• The strategic balance between China and India is unlikely to be altered because of the Chinese nuclear expansion, but New Delhi needs to keep a close eye on its neighbour and work on enhancing its own strategic capabilities.

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