CONTEXT   After the February military coup, the future of Myanmar’s democracy is uncertain, but the country, sandwiched between two powerful states competing for power and influence, is certain to be a key piece in the region’s geopolitics.

As the coup has undone the comfortable space New Delhi’s Myanmar policy occupied for close to a decade, New Delhi would need to be nimble-footed and creative in its responses with well-thought-out strategic choices taking precedence over knee-jerk reactions.

COUP, POLITICS, GEOPOLITICS AND ROHINGYAS

• If Myanmar’s democracy prior to the February 2021 coup was inadequate and intolerant towards minorities, its political future will be a lot more complicated, making the choices of outside powers far more constrained. 
• Adding to it strong reactions and the threat of sanctions from the United States and the West in the wake of the recent coup could lead to unique political realignments in Myanmar.
• As a result, even though the democratic credentials of the former State Counsellor, Aung San Suu Kyi, remain deeply diminished today, the international community may not have any alternatives when it comes to pursuing the restoration of democracy in the country.
• Consequently, those who are batting for Suu Kyi in the international community in order to build to rebuild the charisma of the fallen messiah, may have to condone her government’s past actions against the Rohingya in order to highlight her suitability to be the saviour of democracy in Myanmar once again.
• Hence, there is the possibility that the case against Myanmar’s conduct during her government’s tenure at the International Court of Justice (ICJ) will most likely be put on the backburner and the plight of the helpless Rohingya will take a backseat or be conveniently forgotten.
• Put differently, increasing global support for Ms. Suu Kyi could potentially spell doom for the persecuted Rohingya.

 THE CHINA FACTOR 

• This is a coup that seems to suit no one except the Tatmadaw, the armed forces of Myanmar.
• In the short run, the coup stands to hurt the interests of China, India and even the rest of the international community, all of whom were able to do business with Myanmar in their own unique ways.
• However, even though international sanctions are unlikely to have a major impact on the country’s largely inward looking junta, it is likely that the international community’s sharp reactions will force the Tatmadaw to turn to China.
• It is to be noted that the coup has complicated even China’s larger regional economic plans in Myanmar, for the time being.
• Beijing has recently been cultivating Ms. Suu Kyi, who was keen on a strong relationship with China given the growing criticism she was facing from the West. But the junta’s jailing her could complicate Beijing’s plans for the country.
• While on the positive side for Beijing, decisive western sanctions will force the military to get closer to China.
• For Beijing, given that it does not come with the ‘baggage’ of democratic norms, it may simply be a matter of rejigging its schedule in Myanmar and getting used to the new scheme of things there.
• To that extent, China will be its biggest beneficiary of the February coup by default.

 NEW DELHI’S DILEMMA 

• While China’s choices are straightforward, it is far more complicated for others, especially India. New Delhi faces the most challenging dilemma on how to respond to the military coup in Myanmar.
• The dual power centres of the military and the civilian government that existed in Naypyitaw until recently, suited New Delhi quite well as it did not have to worry about hurting the international community’s normative concerns or sacrificing its national interests while engaging them both.
• The February coup has undone that comfortable space New Delhi’s Myanmar policy occupied for close to a decade. While India’s national interests, under the new circumstances, would clearly lie in dealing with whoever is in power in Myanmar, India would find it difficult to openly support the junta given the strong western and American stance.
• On the other hand, it can ill-afford to offend the junta by actively seeking a restoration of democracy. Being a close neighbour with clear strategic interests in Myanmar, offending the junta would be counter-productive.
• Although the Ministry of External Affairs statement — “We believe that the rule of law and the democratic process must be upheld. We are monitoring the situation closely” — is definitely in favour of restoring democracy, but its past support for the pro democracy movement in Myanmar is unlikely to return as the nature of the regional geopolitics has changed with the arrival of China on the scene.
• New Delhi’s new Myanmar policy will therefore be a function of interests rather than norms.

 OTHER CHALLENGES FOR INDIA

• One, Myanmar’s military played a helpful role in helping New Delhi contain the North-eastern insurgencies by allowing Indian military to pursue insurgents across the border into Myanmar.
• Coordinated action and intelligence sharing between the two forces have in the recent past been instrumental in beating back the insurgent groups in the northeast.

• Second, the issue of providing succour to the Rohingya in the wake of the military coup in Myanmar. Unless the military decides to engage in a peace process, the Rohingya question is likely to be pushed aside with the campaign against them continuing relentlessly, perhaps with even more ferocity.

The inability of the states in the region to address the legitimate concerns of the Rohingya or increased violations of their rights could potentially lead to a rise of extremism within the community, which in the longer run would not be in India’s interests.

New Delhi is currently left with very few clear policy options. It must continue to maintain relations with the government in power in Myanmar while discreetly pushing for political reconciliation in the country. In the meantime, the focus must be on improving trade, connectivity, and security links between the two sides.

Reference:

1. https://www.thehindu.com/opinion/lead/the-long-and-the-short-of-indias-naypyitaw-dilemma/article33785809.ece