Context:

• There is speculation in the media that New Delhi could soon invite Australia to join the Malabar naval exercises to be held later this year. This article explains that India’s plan for naval coalition building alone will not credibly deter China’s military power in the Indian Ocean.

News in detail

• A key meeting of India’s Ministry of Defence discussed the issue of adding Australia to the trilateral Malabar naval exercise with Japan and the United States in the Bay of Bengal later this year.
• It appears a green signal to Australia could soon be given, making it the first time since 2007 that all members of Quad will participate in a joint military drill.

• Refer International Relations section for details on Malabar exercise & Quad.

Chinese view about including Australia

• Chinese have long opposed a coalition of democracies in the Indo-Pacific region.
• The Chinese leadership sees the maritime Quadrilateral as an Asian-NATO that seeks only to contain China’s rise.

• At a time of strained bilateral ties with China, India’s intention to involve Australia in the Malabar drill could only be considered as a move directed against China.

• India was risking harsh consequences by putting more pressure on China and moving to expand its sphere of influence into the entire Indian Ocean and the South Pacific.

Arguments in favour : 

• Many Indian analysts believe the time is right for India to shed its traditional defensiveness in the maritime domain following the stand-off in Ladakh.
• An alliance with the U.S., Japan and Australia can counter Chinese moves in the Indian Ocean.

• U.S. and Japanese navies have little spare capacity for sustained surveillance and deterrence operations in the IOR while Australia is the only one ready and able to partner India in securing the Eastern Indian Ocean.

Strategic rationale of the military-Quad

• India’s priority is to acquire strategic capabilities to counter a Chinese naval presence in the Indian Ocean.

Arguments against:

• India’s invitation to Australia to participate in the Malabar exercise sends contrary signals to China at a time when India and China are negotiating a truce on the border in Eastern Ladakh.
• If China responded through aggressive posturing in the Eastern Indian Ocean, it could needlessly open up a new front in the India-China conflict.

• With the strategic contest between the U.S. and China in East Asia and Southeast Asia hotting up, there is every possibility that the military-Quad will be used to draw India into the security dynamics of the Asia-Pacific.

China has been cautious

• Despite a growing presence in the Indian Ocean, the People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) is yet to physically threaten Indian interests at sea.
• Chinese warships have not challenged Indian sovereignty in its territorial waters, or ventured close to Indian islands with malign intent.
• PLAN assets have not impeded the passage of Indian merchantmen in the regional sea lanes and choke points.
• Though Chinese research and intelligence ship presence close to the Andaman Islands has relatively expanded, Chinese maritime agencies ensure that operations do not cross the threshold of conflict with India.
• Chinese Navy has avoided any entanglement with Indian naval ships in the subcontinental littorals.
• This means that the onus of the first move to precipitate a crisis in the Eastern Indian Ocean lies with the Indian Navy.

Need for careful thought:

• Naval coalition building alone will not credibly deter Chinese naval power in the Indian Ocean.
• Upgrading the trilateral Malabar to a quadrilateral, without acquiring the requisite combat and deterrence capability, could yield gains for India in the short term, but would prove ineffective in the long run.

• Thus New Delhi should not sign up to quadrilateral engagement without a cost-benefit exercise and proportionate gains in the strategic-operational realm.